TPS, Conviction for immigration purposes
Ramos was convicted of two misdemeanors in Nevada: petit larceny, and driving under the influence.The petit larceny proceeding took place in Las Vegas Municipal Court, ended with a nolo contendere plea, and the conviction was ultimately vacated for unknown reasons.
After his removal proceedings began, Ramos applied for Temporary Protected Status relief. The Citizenship and Immigration Service denied relief on the basis that Ramos was ineligible under the statute, having been convicted of two misdemeanors. Both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.
Ramos argues that the vacatur of his petit larceny conviction makes him eligible for TPS, but he makes no argument that this vacatur was substantive and not procedural, and states only that the record is inconclusive as to why the case was vacated. Ramos fails to carry his burden.
Ramos’s second major claim is that his convictions in Municipal Court were not “convictions” at all—at least not for immigration purposes.
Here, there is no indication that a standard of proof lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” was accepted by the Municipal Court, and Ramos does not even argue as much. He pled nolo contendere to the petit larceny misdemeanor. The Municipal Court “found [petitioner] guilty” and a “fine [was] imposed.” It had the authority to adjudge guilt and to impose penalties. Finally, the petit larceny offense that the proceeding dealt with is classified by the state as a “crime,” not “violation,” “infraction,” or anything else: it is listed in Title 15 of the state code, “Crimes and punishments.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.240.
All relevant factors identified by the BIA point to the conclusion that the petit larceny adjudication was a “conviction” in a “criminal proceeding.” Ramos does not distinctly argue why the DUI conviction does not qualify as a conviction, and therefore fails to carry his burden with respect to this argument.
Jx, Motion to remand
Portillo-Benavides does not challenge the BIA’s determination that his conviction under California Health and Safety Code § 11350(a) is a controlled-substance violation that renders him inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). The Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that Portillo-Benavides failed to credibly establish that exceptional circumstances caused him to miss his hearing.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to remand on the ground that Portillo-Benavides did not submit evidence demonstrating prima facie eligibility for relief.
Beltran-Delgado was the victim of gang violence and robberies and fears future harm by gang members in El Salvador. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Beltran-Delgado failed to show that the gang members were or would be motivated by a protected ground. Accordingly, Beltran-Delgado’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.
Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief because Beltran-Delgado did not establish he would be tortured by the government of El
Salvador or with its consent or acquiescence.
Even if Campos Hernandez’s asylum application was timely, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that his past experiences in Guatemala, including the incident in which police once hit him in the chest with a rifle, did not rise to the level of persecution. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that his fear of gang-related crime in Guatemala is not a basis for relief. Accordingly, Campos Hernandez’s asylum claim fails.
The Court lacks jurisdiction to review Campos Hernandez’s contentions related to an application for permanent resident status because he did not raise them to the BIA.
Asy/change in circumstances
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that even though Ramirez-Escobar suffered past persecution on account of an imputed political opinion based on her relationship with her ex-boyfriend, her presumption of a wellfounded fear of future persecution was rebutted by a fundamental change in circumstances. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s finding that Ramirez-Escobar did not otherwise establish a well-founded fear of persecution.
Because Ramirez-Escobar failed to establish eligibility for asylum, she necessarily failed to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief because Ramirez-Escobar failed to establish that it is more likely than not she would be tortured by the Guatemalan government or with its consent or acquiescence.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Villanueva-Moran’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the motion was filed over three years after the agency’s final order and Villanueva-Moran failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen.
The Court lacks jurisdiction to review Villanueva-Moran’s contentions related to humanitarian asylum and equitable tolling based on ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his asylum claim because he failed to raise them to the BIA. The Court also lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen under its sua sponte authority.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination based on both the discrepancy between Yang’s testimony and visa application related to her alleged detention, and on the discrepancy between her testimony and other evidence in the record regarding her alleged employment termination. The agency reasonably rejected Yang’s explanations for the inconsistencies. Yang does not challenge the IJ’s negative demeanor finding. In the absence of credible testimony, Yang’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.