Verdugo-Gonzalez v. Holder

** Receiving stolen property under CPC section 496(a) categorically qualifies as an aggravated felony**

Under CA law, the crime of “receipt of stolen property” consists of three elements: (a) the property was stolen, and (b) the defendant was in possession of it, (c) knowing it was stolen. There is a categorical match between the full range of conduct proscribed by CPC section 496(a) and the generic definition of a theft offense which is defined as “the taking of property or an exercise of control over property without consent with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent.” The act of buying or receiving stolen property, as well as concealing, withholding, and selling property, knowing that it was stolen entails an exercise of control over the property without consent and with the intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership. In addition, CPC section 496(a) also covers someone who “aids” in the concealing, selling, or withholding of stolen property knowing the property to be stolen or so obtained. Because Duenas-Alvarez holds that the generic definition of a theft offense includes the crime of “aiding and abetting” a theft offense, there is a categorical match between the full range of conduct proscribed under CPC section 496(a) and the generic definition of a theft offense. Verdugo-Gonzalez’s argument under United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), that aiding and abetting liability is like accessory after the fact liability fails because while that case held that accessory after the fact liability may render a state conviction statute broader than the generic definition of a theft offense, it addressed section 10851(a) of the California Vehicle Code. This statute
expressly includes the actions of an accessory within its reach, unlike CPC section 496(a) which does not mention accessory liability. Case law has identified the offense of being an accessory after the fact as different from and outside the generic definition because someone who subsequently helped the primary wrongdoer does not necessarily aid in the commission of the underlying offense. If Verdugo-Gonzalez’s offense was accessory after the fact, he would have been convicted under CPC section 32.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2009/09/14/06-73733.pdf