New 9th Circuit and BIA Immigration Cases

**Motion to remand, IAC**

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to remand due to ineffective assistance of counsel because they failed to comply with the Lozada requirements and the ineffective assistance they allege is not plain on the face of the record.  It follows that Petitioners’ due process claim fails.  The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to remand to introduce evidence because the BIA considered the evidence they submitted and acted within its broad discretion in determining that it was insufficient to warrant reopening.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/02/26/07-75059.pdf

**Right to counsel during bond determination**

Ruiz-Ochoa was not denied his right to counsel because he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel when he affirmatively asked the IJ to proceed with his bond determination without counsel after the IJ had offered to continue his hearing for a third time in order to secure counsel.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/02/26/07-74787.pdf

**Motion to continue**

The IJ did not abuse her discretion in denying Gonzalez-Reyes’ third motion for a continuance where Petitioner failed to show eligibility for any relief. Gonzalez-Reyes’ contention that the IJ erred by denying her post-conclusion
voluntary departure is unsupported by the record because she did not request such relief.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/02/26/07-74750.pdf

**MTR**

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen where the new evidence they presented did not support prima facie eligiblity for cancellation of removal.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/02/26/07-74685.pdf

**MTR**

To the extent that Diaz-Gutierrez’s motion could be construed as a motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Diaz-Gutierrez’s second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred where the motion was filed more than three years after the BIA’s final administrative order.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/02/26/07-74580.pdf

**MTR**

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in construing Singh’s third motion to reopen as seeking reopening of its January 26, 2005, order, and denying the motion as untimely filed and number-barred. 

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/02/26/07-74075.pdf

**MTR**

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Shergil’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, and Shergil failed to establish changed country conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation. In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding Shergil failed to explain why the psychological report attached to his motion could not have been discovered prior to his immigration hearing.

 http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/02/26/07-73793.pdf

**MTR**

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bila’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed almost nine months after the final order of deportation, ninety days of final order of deportation), and Bila failed to establish that any of the regulatory exceptions apply.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/02/26/07-73770.pdf

No jx.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/02/26/07-73487.pdf

**MTR**

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Escobedo Gomez’s second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred because it was filed over a year after the BIA’s August 2, 2005, final order, and equitable tolling is unavailable to Escobedo Gomez where he did not establish prejudice from the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/02/26/07-73368.pdf