Singh v. Holder
**Changed country conditions, internal relocation, Sikhs re pol. op. v. religious persecution; CAT**
Guerrero-Silva v. Holder
Coloma Johnson v. Holder
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/03/30/05-75880.pdf
Brailsford v. Holder
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/03/29/05-77319.pdf
Ledezma-Galacia v. Holder
While current law provides that Petitioner’s sodomy conviction is “sexual abuse of a minor,” an aggravated felony, he may not now be removed from the country based this 1988 conviction. The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) that made individuals deportable for aggravated felony convictions did not apply to convictions prior to November 18, 1988, and neither Congress’s overhaul of the grounds for deportation in 1990 (IMMAct) nor its rewrite of the definition of aggravated felony with IIRIRA in 1996 erased that temporal limitation. Section 602 of the IMMAct did not repeal the section of the AADA specifying that an aggravated felony conviction entered prior to November 18, 1998 cannot serve as the basis for a charge of removability. Therefore, ADAA’s temporal limitation remains in effect as an exception to other temporal provisions enacted later and precludes Petitioner’s deportation. The BIA’s interpretation of IMMAct § 602(c) merits no deference because, when read in light of the applicable principles of statutory interpretation, that provision is not ambiguous in the respect the BIA deemed it to be (in Matter of Lettman, )). banc1998) (en BIA22 I. & N. Dec. 365 (
Dissent: Bybee: The BIA’s interpretation of the statutory scheme in Matter of Lettman was reasonable, and the Court must defer to it. In 1990 with IMMAct, Congress provided that the new deportation provisions would apply to individuals even if the facts making them deportable occurred before enactment of the IMMAct, thus overriding the previous applicability provision. In 1996, Congress amended the definition of aggravated felony to include sexual abuse of a minor. Congress chose to apply the amended definition retroactively to convictions that occurred prior to the enactment of IIRIRA. Read together, these immigration statutes made Ledezma subject to removal
.http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2010/03/29/03-73648.pdf
Limones v. Holder
**Due process, hardship**
The IJ did not violate due process because he fully credited Ms. Delgado’s testimony as well as the documentary medical evidence regarding her daughter’s health. Petitioners have made no showing that their daughter’s testimony would have been noncumulative. In addition, Petitioners fail to present a colorable claim that the immigration judge violated due process because the immigration judge’s hardship analysis on Ms. Delgado’s application was tainted by the judge’s erroneous conclusion that Mr Limones had committed a crime of moral turpitude. Petitioners have made no showing that the IJ’s error affected the judge’s hardship analysis, and any error was harmless in light of the Board’s independent and untainted review of the hardship issue as applied to both petitioners.
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/03/26/07-71952.pdf
Woods v. Holder
Woods made a valid admission of a controlled substance offense and is inadmissible, and thus ineligible for registry, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Her contention that her admission during removal proceedings was not validly obtained because she was not provided with a definition of the elements of the offense in a way that she could understand, and that her admission was not voluntary because she was confused, is not supported by the record. Woods’ cannot establish eligibility for withholding of removal based on membership in the particular social group of ”single, homeless, black, exclusively English-speaking women in their mid-40s with serious health issues” because the identified characteristics (wealth and homelessness) are alterable conditions. In addition, Woods acknowledged that she has no specific reason to fear persecution or ill-treatment in Honduras, but only a generalized fear of moving there.
Chawla v. Holder
**MTR; due process**
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen because Petitioners failed to show that the evidence they submitted in support of their motion to reopen was previously unavailable. No jx to review due process challenge.
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2010/03/26/05-77410.pdf
Matter of H-L-H and Z-Y-Z
**Well-founded fear, China’s family planning policy, weight to be afforded evidence**
The IJ’s favorable credibility determination is not “clearly erroneous.” However, it remains the respondent’s burden to establish that a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear being subjected to a forced sterilization or sanctions rising to the level of persecution upon her return to China. The question whether the respondent has carried her burden of establishing a well-founded fear that the family planning policy will be enforced against her upon return to China is reviewed here de novo, and the Board has authority to give different weight to the evidence from that given by the IJ. State Department reports on country conditions are highly probative evidence and are usually the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations. The respondent here has not established a well-founded fear that the family planning policy will be enforced against her through means constituting persecution upon return to China. According to the DOS, the central gov’t policy prohibits the use of physical coercion to compel persons to submit to abortion or sterilization. Respondent’s evidence does not establish a policy of forced sterilization of parents who return to China with children who were born outside the country. In addition, the evidence can not be granted substantial weight-the country conditions evidence was obtained for the purpose of the immigration hearing, and the authors of the various personal letters are interested witnesses who were not subject to cross-examination; other letters lack sufficient detail. In addition, the respondent has not shown that her locality (Fujian Province) represents a current exception to the general rules re enforcing family planning.
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3676.pdf
Chawla v. Holder
The agency’s adverse credibility finding is not supported by substantial evidence because none of the following seven reasons articulated by the IJ or BIA, considered either separately or in combination, provide a legitimate basis to question Chawla’s credibility: (1) Submission of differing newspaper articles (Chala provided reasonable explanations and agency did not specifically address explanations); (2) failure to explain sentence in gov’t newspaper article (Chawla’s inability to explain the single, contradicted sentence can’t support adverse finding); (3) failure to provide corroborating evidence regarding his suspension from employment, and inconsistent evidence regarding end of employment (based on impermissible speculation and conjecture and inconsistency involved did not go to heart of claim); (4) failure to provide “strong” corroborating evidence of the bus explosion and subsequent arrest and abuse (based on impermissible speculation and conjecture) ; (5) an “implausible” explanation of how Chala received his visa to enter the United States (mischaracterization of the testimony); (6) background information regarding the current treatment of Sikhs in New Dehli (an error to base an adverse credibility finding on 2003 reports when Chala’s mistreatment was in 1998); and (7) testimony that the Indian Police are still interested in Chawla (agency’s disbelief based on impermissible speculation).
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