Cortez-Pineda v. Holder

**Entry date, NTA; credibility, special cancellation; asy**

Hakopian did not establish a blanket rule that facts alleged in a Notice to Appear, if admitted before the IJ, bind the court and the parties. Rather, Hakopian clarified that an entry date alleged in an NTA might not bind the IJ if the NTA is amended or if, as here, the entry date is subsequently contested. The government should not be held to have made a binding judicial admission about Cortez- Pineda’s entry date because the government vigorously disputed the entry date during the November 2006 evidentiary hearing after notice was given to Cortez-Pineda that the issue was in dispute, and Cortez-Pineda never expressly objected on the grounds of judicial admission, instead stipulating to an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Cortez-Pineda’s counsel never suggested that the NTA  conclusively established Cortez-Pineda’s entry date, and his counsel’s passing reference to the entry-date allegation in the NTA cannot reasonably be construed as an objection to a contest of that issue. Moreover, although “admissions in the pleadings are generally binding,” Cortez- Pineda’s counsel did not raise the judicial admission argument to the IJ.  Evaluating the evidence of Cortez-Pineda’s entry date, the IJ’s determination that the June 1990 entry date was not credible is supported by substantial evidence.  The IJ also appropriately concluded that Cortez-Pineda was not eligible for special rule cancellation.  The IJ’s adverse credibility with respect to the asylum and withholding is also supported by substantial evidence.