Romero contends that he obtained derivative citizenship from his mother’s naturalization in this country, in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1432. The sole issue on appeal is whether Romero’s paternity was legitimated under Salvadoran law, by the inclusion of his father’s name on his birth certificate which would defeat his claim of derivative citizenship. Although Romero was born out of wedlock, his parents’ subsequent marriage prior to his mother’s naturalization established Romero’s paternity by legitimation.  Romero asserts that because he was not legitimated under Salvadoran law as it existed at the time of his birth, the change in the Salvadoran constitution did not change his legitimation status.  However, the BIA has definitely ruled that the 1983 amendment to the Salvadoran constitution eliminating legitimacy distinctions served to legitimate any child born out of wedlock.  The fact that Romero was born prior to the enactment of the 1983 constitutional amendment and his contention that his father did not necessarily consent to civil registration of his son’s birth certificate do not negate Petitioner’s legitimation under Salvadoran law.

Raymond C. Fisher and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges, and Robert J. Timlin, Senior District Judge

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/12/19/08-74674.pdf

Kwong’s conviction of first-degree burglary under California Penal Code § 459 was a conviction of an aggravated felony, and was sufficiently established by the state court’s abstract of judgment. That abstract noted that Kwong had pleaded guilty to a violation of § 459 of the Penal Code and described the crime as “Burglary — First Deg.” Section 460 of the Code defines first-degree and second-degree burglary; first-degree burglary is “burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, vessel . . . which is inhabited and designed for habitation, floating home . . . , or trailer coach . . . , or the inhabited portion of any other building.” Cal. Penal Code § 460(a). The amended § 460(a) requires unlawful entry of an inhabited structure to meet its definition of first-degree burglary.

The abstract of judgment also indicated that Kwong had been sentenced to two years of imprisonment.  Lopez-Cardona flatly held that, under Becker, first-degree burglary in violation of California Penal Code § 459 was a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).

Kwong’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is  rejected.

William C. Canby, Jr., Carlos T. Bea* and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/12/07/04-72167.pdf

The opinion filed on June 21, 2011, 651 F.3d 969, is withdrawn.  The BIA correctly concluded that Carrillo de Palacios returned to the United States after being “ordered removed under . . . any . . . provision of law, and . . . enter[ed] or attempt[ed] to reenter the United States without being admitted,” which renders her inadmissible under INA § 212 (a)(9)(C)(i)(II). The BIA also correctly concluded that she does not satisfy the requirements of INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(ii)’s exception to inadmissibility. In order to be eligible under INA section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii), an alien must remain outside the United States for more than ten years before returning to the United States. By requiring repeat immigration offenders to pay the penalty of waiting ten years outside the United States before receiving the privilege of lawful reentry, § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) promotes Congress’s underlying policy goals of making admission more difficult for immigration recidivists.

Susan P. Graber and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges, and Roger T. Benitez,* District Judge

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/12/01/09-72059.pdf

The BIA also did not err in determining that Bains’s conviction for receipt of stolen property under CPC § 496(a), for which he was sentenced to at least one year imprisonment, constituted an aggravated felony theft offense.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/11/23/09-73075.pdf

The BIA properly denied Ventura’s asylum and withholding of removal claims because Ventura failed to establish a nexus between his fear of persecution and one of the protected grounds The only incident of past persecution is Ventura’s encounter with his neighbor, but Ventura’s testimony indicates that these threats arose out of a personal conflict between Ventura’s father and neighbor, not on account of Ventura’s political opinions or organizational membership. Further, Ventura’s fear of being kidnaped is not a sufficient basis for asylum or withholding of removal because asylum is not available to victims of indiscriminate violence, unless they are singled out on account of a protected ground. Ventura produced no evidence that he would actually be targeted for kidnaping, and even if he had, immigrants returning to their home country after living in the United States do not comprise a cognizable social group. Ventura also offered no evidence to show that his neighbor would persist in or act on the threats that he made more than twenty years ago. Ventura’s speculation that he might be kidnaped does not establish a likelihood of torture.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/11/23/09-70141.pdf

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination because Hovsepyan’s inconsistencies concerning the arrest of his brother and the break-in at his family’s home go to the heart of his claim. Hovsepyan’s repeated inconsistencies were not trivial, but rather undermined his version of events “central to” how he was persecuted and why he fled.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/11/23/08-71349.pdf

While the government rightly concedes that the IJ erred in some of her characterizations of Parmar’s testimony, the determination made by the IJ and BIA nonetheless was supported by substantial evidence. The IJ and BIA noted that Parmar was unresponsive, especially regarding questions about the arrest and detention that Parmar claimed precipitated his flight from India. There were also inconsistencies in Parmar’s testimony, notably regarding the timing of his third arrest.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/11/23/08-70109.pdf

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final order and Singh failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing motions to reopen.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/11/23/10-73463.pdf