The BIA also did not err in determining that Bains’s conviction for receipt of stolen property under CPC § 496(a), for which he was sentenced to at least one year imprisonment, constituted an aggravated felony theft offense.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/11/23/09-73075.pdf

The BIA properly denied Ventura’s asylum and withholding of removal claims because Ventura failed to establish a nexus between his fear of persecution and one of the protected grounds The only incident of past persecution is Ventura’s encounter with his neighbor, but Ventura’s testimony indicates that these threats arose out of a personal conflict between Ventura’s father and neighbor, not on account of Ventura’s political opinions or organizational membership. Further, Ventura’s fear of being kidnaped is not a sufficient basis for asylum or withholding of removal because asylum is not available to victims of indiscriminate violence, unless they are singled out on account of a protected ground. Ventura produced no evidence that he would actually be targeted for kidnaping, and even if he had, immigrants returning to their home country after living in the United States do not comprise a cognizable social group. Ventura also offered no evidence to show that his neighbor would persist in or act on the threats that he made more than twenty years ago. Ventura’s speculation that he might be kidnaped does not establish a likelihood of torture.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/11/23/09-70141.pdf

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination because Hovsepyan’s inconsistencies concerning the arrest of his brother and the break-in at his family’s home go to the heart of his claim. Hovsepyan’s repeated inconsistencies were not trivial, but rather undermined his version of events “central to” how he was persecuted and why he fled.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/11/23/08-71349.pdf

While the government rightly concedes that the IJ erred in some of her characterizations of Parmar’s testimony, the determination made by the IJ and BIA nonetheless was supported by substantial evidence. The IJ and BIA noted that Parmar was unresponsive, especially regarding questions about the arrest and detention that Parmar claimed precipitated his flight from India. There were also inconsistencies in Parmar’s testimony, notably regarding the timing of his third arrest.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/11/23/08-70109.pdf

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final order and Singh failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing motions to reopen.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/11/23/10-73463.pdf

The motion for leave to file an amicus brief in support of the petitioner’s petition for rehearing, filed by Northwest Immigrant Rights Project on August 1, 2011, is GRANTED.

The panel has voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing. Judge Fisher has voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc and Judges Tashima and Wolf have so recommended. The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc are DENIED

By admitting at the pleading stage that he was convicted of possessing cocaine for sale and conceding that he was, therefore, removable, Perez-Mejia relieved the government of its burden of offering further evidence to prove that he was removable. The government is not estopped by its error in granting Perez-Mejia LPR status from correcting its mistake and ordering his removal. Perez-Mejia’s admission to the cocaine offense made him ineligible for a 212(h) waiver of removability.

A. Wallace Tashima and Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges, and Mark L. Wolf, District Judge

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/11/23/07-70118.pdf

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/11/22/07-70110.pdf

The record does not establish that Bautista’s conviction for commercial burglary is an aggravated felony burglary. The conviction records relating to Bautista’s burglary conviction in violation of CPC sections 459 and 460(b) indicate a plea to “willfully and unlawfully enter[ing] a commercial building occupied by Wells Fargo Bank, Daly City, with the intent to commit larceny or any felony, in violation of Penal Code section 460(b).” This is insufficient under the modified categorical approach to demonstrate that his conviction necessarily rested on facts satisfying the elements of generic burglary.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/11/22/07-72051.pdf