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Henrique-Rivas v. Holder (PUB- ebo)

January 31, 2012

Upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused active judges, it is ordered that this case be reheard en banc pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3.
(whether persons who testify against gang members form a protected group for asylum purposes)

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2012/02/09/09-71571o.pdf

unpublished mem: http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2011/09/07/09-71571.pdf

Matter of Avetisyan (PUB)

January 31, 2012

Administrative Closure

Pursuant to the authority delegated by the Attorney General and the responsibility to exercise that authority with independent judgment and discretion, the Immigration Judges and the Board may administratively close removal proceedings, even if a party opposes, if it is otherwise appropriate under the circumstances. Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 1996), overruled. In determining whether administrative closure of proceedings is appropriate, an IJ or the Board should weigh all relevant factors, including but not limited to: (1) the reason administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to administrative closure; (3) the likelihood the respondent will succeed on any petition, application, or other action he or she is pursuing outside of removal proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of the closure; (5) the responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; and (6) the ultimate outcome of removal proceedings (for example, termination of the proceedings or entry of a removal order) when the case is recalendared before the IJ or the appeal is reinstated before the Board.

Here, the record shows that the respondent is the beneficiary of a prima facie approvable visa petition filed by her now United States citizen spouse, who is the father of her United States citizen child. The DHS objected to administrative closure of the proceedings only because that visa petition had not yet been adjudicated. However, despite the numerous continuances granted by the Immigration Judge, and through no apparent fault of the respondent or her petitioner husband, the visa petition has been pending before the DHS for a significant and unexplained period of time. The DHS has not identified any obvious impediment to the approval of the visa petition or to the respondent’s ability to successfully apply for adjustment of status once the visa petition is approved. Her adjustment of status would warrant termination of these proceedings. The circumstances in this case support the administrative closure of proceedings.

http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3740.pdf

Tyson v. Holder (PUB)

January 27, 2012

212(c)/stipulated facts

Applying the repeal of § 212(c) relief here would produce an impermissible retroactive effect on Tyson, who was convicted pursuant to a stipulated facts agreement based on a reasonable expectation that it would not negatively affect her immigration status. The record demonstrates that Tyson reasonably relied on the law that existed when she faced criminal proceedings in 1980; therefore, the repeal of § 212(c) may not be applied retroactively to her conviction.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2012/01/27/08-70219.pdf

Oshodi v. Holder (PUB)

January 26, 2012
tags:

Credibility, REAL ID; due process

The BIA sufficiently complied with this Court’s mandate because it considered the REAL ID Act’s impact on the IJ’s finding that Oshodi’s claims were not sufficiently corroborated. Even assuming that the REAL ID Act mandates notice that corroborating evidence will be required, such notice was provided in this case. The IJ advised, “Put down all the reasons in detail, that you claimed to have been harmed, your fear of harm, the circumstances of it on the application. If you have corroborative evidence of your claim, I do strongly recommend that you submit it, especially under recent changes of the law and especially since you never previously applied. I’m letting you know that corroborative evidence is recommended. Do you understand it?”

The IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence and Oshodi’s due process rights were not violated. The IJ’s exclusion of Nigerian police reports, his 1981 hospital report, and his mother’s 1968 death certificate from the record due to lack of authentication was proper.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2012/01/26/08-71478.pdf

Matter of J-R- Velasquez (PUB)

January 24, 2012

Authentication of documents/criminal records

Conviction records that were submitted by electronic means are conclusively admissible as evidence of a criminal conviction in immigration proceedings if they are authenticated in the manner specified by section 240(c)(3)(C) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(c), but those methods of authentication, which operate as “safe harbors,” are not mandatory
or exclusive, and documents that are authenticated in other ways may be admitted if they are found to be reliable.
A document that requires authentication but that is not authenticated is not admissible as “other evidence that reasonably indicates the existence of a criminal conviction” within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(d).

http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3739.pdf

Matter of U. Singh (PUB)

January 19, 2012

Ag.fel./COV/ stalking

A decision by a Federal court of appeals reversing a precedent decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals is not binding authority outside the circuit in which the case arises.

A stalking offense for harassing conduct in violation of section 646.9(b) of the California Penal Code is a crime of violence under and therefore an aggravated felony.  Matter of Malta, 23 I&N Dec. 656 (BIA 2004), reaffirmed. Malta-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2007), followed in jurisdiction only.

 

http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3738.pdf

Meza-Vallejos v. Holder (PUB oa)

January 19, 2012

The opinion filed October 11, 2011, slip op. 18769, and appearing at 660 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2011), is hereby
amended as follows: Remove the paragraph beginning on slip op. 18782 with “A hypothetical . . .” and ending on slip op. 18783 with . . . and convenience.”).” With this amendment, the panel has voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing. The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. No further petitions for panel or en banc rehearing will be entertained.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2012/01/20/07-70638.pdf

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